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NUMBER 1

Local Control of Mining Activities

on Federal Lands
James S. Burling*
The conflict between development and preservationof natural
resources is often embroiled in the conflict between the powers of
state and federal government to control development affecting
public lands. In this article, the authorconsiders recent decisions
in Californiaand Wyoming respecting the regulation of mining
operationsand focuses on the issues of federalpreemption and the
nature of patented and unpatented mining claims. The authorconcludes that while a local agency may regulate private activities
such as mining on federal lands, that agency may neitherprohibit
nor deliberatelyfrustrate the purpose of federal laws designed to
promote and regulate mining.
Highway 1 in California affords some of the most spectacular highway
scenery in the continental United States. Framed by the Pacific Ocean
to the west and the redwood dotted coast range to the east, the Highway
1 landscape has long been a haven for tourists. A favorite feature is Pico
Blanco, a clean white mountain peak rising in the Coast Range south of
Big Sur, California. Pico Blanco has become a popular cause recently for
a variety of environmental groups. Pico Blanco is white because it is composed entirely of a chemically pure high grade limestone deposit. This
deposit, which lies partially inside the Los Padres National Forest, is
covered by unpatented mining claims that belong to a small, family-owned
mining business, the Granite Rock Company. Granite Rock desires to mine
a portion of this chemically pure limestone deposit which is not visible
from Highway 1. In 1981, the federal government approved a five-year'
*Fellow, College of Public Interest Law, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California. J.D., 1983, University of Arizona College of Law; M.S., 1977, Brown; B.A., 1976, Hamilton
College. The Pacific Legal Foundation prepared appellate briefs for the Alaska Miners Association, the Placer Miners Association, and the Miners Advocacy Council in the case of Granite
Rock Company v. California Costal Commission, 590 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev '-,
768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
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plan of operation for a small scale feasibility testing mining program.'
The State of California Coastal Commission and the County of Monterey
would prefer that Granite Rock not mine the property. Numerous environmental organizations have expressed similar opinions.
The dispute over Pico Blanco is a classic distillation of the struggle
between private property owners, the federal government, and state and
local officials over the development of natural resources. The ultimate
resolution of this dispute may well affect the balance between competing
claimants to the use and control of natural resources on public lands for
years to come. A federal district court decision in this dispute has
dramatically altered, or misinterpreted, the fundamental nature of mining claims.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the district
court decision, sharply limited the power of local governments to regulate
mining on federal lands and even cautioned the federal government against
overregulation of mining in national forests.' This controversy is further
complicated by the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)4 which provides a framework for state protection of the coastal zone.
BACKGROUND

Early Attempts at Preservation
In response to a perceived need to prevent all development along the
Big Sur coast, a number of environmental organizations lobbied for a
federal takeover of the region. Specifically, a proposal was made in the
mid-1970's that the federal government acquire state and private properties in the area and create a national recreation area.' The national forests
of the Big Sur coast would have been incorporated into this recreation
area as well. Under this scheme, private property owners would have acquired the status of inholders and local governments would be required
to act in a manner consistent with the purposes and requirements of the
federal recreation area. For example, if mining were to be found inconsistent with the recreational purpose of the area, then such mining would
be restricted or condemned. The strongest opposition to this plan came
from local property owners. Their concerted lobbying effort against the
federalization scheme is credited with defeating the federal takeover.6
Because the plan was defeated, the state and local governments retain
jurisdiction over activities within their boundaries.
Principal among the organizations which opposed a mining operation
along the coast was the Big Sur Foundation, a group dedicated to restricting development in the region in order to maintain the environmental
1. Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (N.D. Cal.
1984), rev'd, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
2. Id. at 1361.
3. Granite Rock Company v. California Coastal Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
4. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West 1985).
5. S. 2551, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 7380 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980); See
Yonhay, Big Sur-The Politics of Preservation, NEW WEST, Dec. 22, 1980, at 33-43.
6. See Yonhay, supra note 5, at 39-43.
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status quo. With the defeat of the federalization plan, and with the election of a presidential administration perceived as favoring development
interests, opponents of mining activities on the Big Sur coast considered
alternative plans. In 1982, the Foundation conducted a study and formulated a strategy to stop the mining at Pico Blanco.' Subsequent actions by the State Attorney General's office, the California Coastal Commission, and the County of Monterey have, with regard to the mining of
Pico Blanco conformed with the strategy outlined by the Big Sur Foundation. This strategy, which will be developed in more detail below, basically consists of the assertion by state and local authorities of comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction over private mining activities on federal land.
This regulation is designed to prohibit or severely restrict the mining of
8
the Pico Blanco deposit. The assertion of regulatory authority is coupled
with a claim that unpatented mining claims are the functional equivalent
of private property, and thus subject to extensive local regulation unfettered by a substantial threat of federal preemption. This last notion was
implicitly accepted by the federal district court in GraniteRock v. Califora radical departure from estabnia Coastal Commission and represents
9
lished principles of mining law.
Mining Plan of Operations
Pursuant to its inherent authority under the Organic Act, the Forest
Service requires that any mineral operator working in a national forest
first submit a plan of operations before commencing work which is likely
to cause a significant disturbance of surface resources.'" In 1981, pursuant
to regulations, Granite Rock Company filed a plan of operations to cover
activities from 1981 to 1986. The plan envisioned removal of ore at the
rate of 15,000 to 32,000 tons per year from a seven acre area not visible
from Highway 1.11 This small scale operation was designed primarily to
test the feasibility of a larger operation involving approximately twenty
acres and for an anticipated life of twenty-five to forty-five years." The
plan provides the Forest Service with a means to assess all potential environmental problems incident to mining, including road building, tailings disposal (if any), noise, water supply, and reclamation. All details pertinent to a mining operation must be included in the plan and deviation
from it is not allowed by the Forest Service. Under all such 3plans, the
mining operations are subject to Forest Service monitoring.
Although state authorities ordinarily do not have an opportunity to
participate actively in the approval process for mining plans of operation
and
7. Hillyer, Responsibility of Monterey County, the California Coastal Commission
Report
a
Blanco,
Pico
on
Mining
Surface
Regulating
for
Service
the United States Forest
Founto the Big Sur Foundation (March 11, 1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file at Big Sur
dation, Monterey, California).
8. See icL at 63-69, 136-144.
9. See GraniteRock, 590 F. Supp. at 1367-75.
10. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4-.5 (1985).
11. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 506, Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
12. Id,
13. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4-.5 (1985).
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within national forests, state coastal authorities are given such power for
mines within the Coastal Zone under the federal CZMA. 14 As applied here,
after receipt of notice of the plan of operations, the California Coastal Commission had thirty days to inform the Forest Service and the Granite Rock
Company of its desire to review the plan. The California Coastal Commission, however, failed to respond in any way to the plan of operations, thus
losing its opportunity to participate in the approval process.1 5 The plan
was approved by the Forest Service in February 1981, and shortly
thereafter Granite Rock commenced operations. The plan of operations
itself has not been subject to attack by the Coastal Commission, although
three years after its approval several environmental groups and the County of Monterey sued the Forest Service over alleged inadequacies in the
approval process. 16 The suit is pending.

Assertions of State Regulatory Authority
Although the California Coastal Commission failed to participate in
the plan of operations review process, it informed the Granite Rock Company on October 17, 1983, after more than two years of operation, that
Granite Rock had to obtain a coastal development permit pursuant to the
California Coastal Act. The Commission explained that the operation had
to be consistent with the California Coastal Management Program, and
that the operation was generally subject to state jurisdiction. 7 Because
of an ongoing bitter dispute between the Coastal Commission and the
Granite Rock Company over the maintenance of a hiking trail over Granite
Rock property, used by the public with company permission,' the Granite
Rock Company feared that the Coastal Commission would not act favorably in a coastal development permitting process. For this reason, Granite
Rock sued the California Coastal Commission claiming that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over mining operations in the national forest
because the CZMA did not give states jurisdiction over mining claims.
Granite Rock argued that the Mining Law of 1872 did not permit a local
government to veto mining activitiy on federal lands, and that the general
doctrine of federal preemption precluded state permitting authority. 9 The
Coastal Commission responded that it had the jurisdictional authority
to require a permit under the CZMA and its general police power. The
Commission, in following the lead of the Big Sur Foundation, claimed that
its jurisdiction over unpatented mining claims derived from the fact that
mining claims were the functional equivalent of fee title.2 0
In a surprising decision, the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of California held that the Granite Rock operations were subject
14. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3) (West 1985).
15. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1366:
16. Big Sur Foundation v. Block, No. C-94-6784-JPV. (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 15, 1984).
17. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1366.
18. The Coastal Commission required Granite Rock to dedicate over a million dollars
worth of private (nonfederal) property to the state in exchange for permission to repair landslide damage on the trail. See infra note 100.
19. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1366-67.
20. See Brief for Appellee, Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 768 F.2d
1077 (9th Cir. 1985).
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to Coastal Commission permitting jurisdiction under the CZMA, were subject to the general police permitting power of the state, and that federal
in fee."
unpatented mining claims were the functional equivalent of estates
2 represented
Circuit,1
Ninth
the
by
reversed
This decision, until it was
a substantial departure from established mining law, added a new twist
to the CZMA, and represented a powerful tool for environmentally oriented
state governments to assert permitting authority and perhaps the power
of prohibiting private resource development on federal lands. Under the
reasoning of the district court, this state authority was not limited either
to the coastal zone or to mining operations. The Ninth Circuit, however,
disagreed with the district court decision and set a strong precedent
against the ability of a local government to impose permitting requirements on federally approved private mining operations on federal
lands.2 3 This article will focus on the implications and validity of the
district and appellate court decisions and their potential application to
other natural resource developments on the public lands.
State Regulatory Authority Under the
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
The Coastal Zone Management Act was passed by Congress in 1972
environdue to concern over the loss of coastal wetlands and estuarine
2 4 The Act
development.
ments and to prod states into controlling coastal
employs grants to encourage states to implement and enforce their own
coastal management plans in accordance with federal2 5guidelines and subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce. While the Act encourages states to manage territory already within a state's jurisdiction
according to federal guidelines, the Act expressly excludes from state
coastal act jurisdiction "lands the use of which is by law subject solely
to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the federal government,
its officers or agents.'"26 Such federal lands are subject to federal consistenthat
cy review whereby the appropriate federal agency must determine
7
is
Act
The
plans.
state
with
consistent
are
lands
federal
on
activities
designed to facilitate comprehensive land management of state coastal
zones by new state agencies, but also to prevent this newly facilitated
state management from unduly interfering with activities on federally
owned or controlled property.
Thus, if mining claims fall within the Act's federal lands exclusion,
they are outside the "coastal zone" and the ambit of direct regulatory
control by the state agency. States have regulatory authority over lands
21.
22.
23.
24.
2d Sess.

See Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. 1367-75.
Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1077.
Id
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West 1985) See CONFERENCE REP. No. 1544 92d Cong.,
12, reprinted in, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4822 [hereinafter CONFERENCE

REPORT].

25. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1452(2), 1455 (West 1985).
26. Id § 1453(1). The California Coastal Commission by state law also has no permit
authority outside the Coastal Zone. CAL. PUBL. RES. CODE, § 30604(d) (West Supp. 1985).
27. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c) (West 1985).
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within the coastal zone, however. In GraniteRock the Coastal Commission argued that the mining claims were nonfederal property and were
within the coastal zone. It also asserted that the CZMA granted to state
agencies a level of regulatory authority so broad that all federal authority which might exist within the coastal zone was subordinated to local
jurisdiction.18 Having failed to participate in the consistency review
process 9 of Granite Rock Corporation's mining plan of operations, the
Coastal Commission attempted to assert regulatory control over the mining operation by requesting that the company apply for a coastal development permit. The Commission claimed jurisdiction under two theories:
the CZMA and its state police power. Jurisdiction under the CZMA
depends primarily upon whether mining claims fall within the federal lands
exclusion and whether the CZMA permits state agencies to act free of
federal preemption. Jurisdiction under the state police power depends upon
whether the commission had authority independent of the CZMA. Jurisdiction also depends upon the reach of federal preemption. These issues are
discussed below.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The Nature of Unpatented FederalMining Claims
Whether or not the California Coastal Commission has CZMA jurisdiction over unpatented federal mining claims on federal lands depends on
whether or not such claims are located on "lands the use of which is subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the federal
government, its officers, or agents."30 The Coastal Commission argued,
and the district court agreed, that mining claims are subject to state
CZMA jurisdiction because they are not under the type of federal control
pertinent to the CZMA exclusion.3 The Ninth Circuit did not reach this
issue and decided the case on other grounds, ruling that a state's power
over mining claims is restricted by the federal preemption doctrine, and
this doctrine is unaffected by the source of a state's power, be it the CZMA
or police power.2
Because the Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether mining
claims are federal property within the coastal zone, the questions raised
by the district court's decision concerning the true nature of federal mining claims are still unanswered. Although the appellate court eventually
ruled that a state has no direct permitting authority over mining operations on federal lands,3 3 the question of whether mining claims should be
treated as federal, state, or private property may still be crucial in determining the extent to which a state may regulate mining operations on
federal lands.
28. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1080.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 15. A coastal state can trigger the consistency

review process. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (West 1985).
30. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(1) (West 1985).
31. GraniteRock, 590 F. Supp. at 1367-70.
32. GraniteRock, 768 F.2d at 1083.
33. Id.
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The district court held that "the special property interest created by
the Mining Act in valid and patentable claims simply does not fit within
Section 1453(1)'s exclusion of lands subject to federal discretion."14 This
conclusion was based on the court's finding that claims are valid property interests, the functional equivalent of a title in fee simple, which cannot be taken by the United States without just compensation. It is wellestablished that mining claims are valuable property rights protected by
the constitutional proscriptions against the taking of property without
just compensation.35 Thus, the power of the federal government to manage
valid unpatented mining claims is subject to constitutional restrictions.
It is apparent that the district court believed such claims were not subject to the sole discretion of the federal government because the constitutional limits imply that the claims
were also subject to some discretion
6
of the individual claim owner.1
The court's reasoning, however, is questionable. The fact that a claim
owner has discretion over claims and is protected by the Constitution does
not necessarily imply that the federal government lacks sole regulatory
jurisdiction over those claims. By analogy, private fee simple property
is fully subject to the jurisdiction of city, county, and state governments,
and can be strictly zoned or regulated within constitutional bounds. Like
federal mining claims, private fee simple property is protected by constitutional prohibitions against taking without just compensation.37 Nevertheless, it is still subject to local control. It is unclear why unpatented
mining claims should not be considered subject to exclusive federal control simply because there are constitutional restrictions against taking
without compensation.3 8
The district court also appears to have equated unpatented mining
claims with fee simple interests in land, such claims being the functional
equivalent of other types of private real property not located in federal
territory. The court emphasized that an unpatented mining claim, upon
application of the holder, can be taken to patent.3 9 Once a mining claim
is patented it is cleary a fee simple interest in land, no longer designated
as "federal" land. The patented claim is subject to local and state jurisdiction, and no federal ownership is retained over it.40 Until the claim is fully
patented, however, the property has not been divested from the government, and the federal government retains complete ownership and jurisdiction over that claim.41 The holder of that unpatented claim, while he has
34. GraniteRock, 590 F. Supp. at 1368.
35. See, e.g., Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 337 (1963); Ickes v.
Virginia-Colorado Development Corporation, 295 U.S. 639,644 (1935); Wilbur v. United States
ex rel Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316 (1930).
36. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. The federal government's sole discretion really begins in its choice to allow mining
claims to be created on federal lands.
39. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1368.
40. Germania Iron Co. v. U.S. 365 U.S. 379, 383 (1897).
41. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963); Freese v. United
States, 639 F.2d 754, 755-56 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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a valuable property right, does not own a fee simple estate. An unpatented
mining claim carries with it only the limited right to extract and remove
minerals pursuant to the federal mining laws. A patented mining claim
is like any other parcel of fee simple land on which any activity may be
conducted in accordance with state and local law.
The district court, however, points to the non-discretionary nature of
patent applications as proof that the federal government lacks sole
discretion.42 Because a claim must be taken to patent upon the completion of a few "technical" procedures, the court reasoned, there is no significant difference between an unpatented and patented mining claim with
respect to federal jurisdiction.4 3 The court also held that the federal government can not prevent mining, thus evidencing a lack of sole federal discretion. The court's reasoning, however, is subject to debate.
By classifying unpatented claims as the functional equivalent of
patented claims, the court raised several troubling questions. The first
question involves the effect of making a patent application. It is well
established that the holder of an unpatented mining claim need never apply
for a patent and may proceed to mine an entire mineral deposit without

doing so." The Granite Rock Company, for example, chose not to apply

for a patent due to the costly, time-consuming, and uncertain nature of
that proceeding. The district court failed to appreciate that a mining claim
usually passes through three stages. First, it exists as an unpatented
claim. Second, it exists as an unpatented claim with a patent application
on file. Finally, the claim becomes a patented mining claim. Traditionally, it is only when the last stage is reached that federal jurisdiction ceases

to exist.4 5 Under the district court's holding, however, the degree of federal

ownership and control during the first two stages is attenuated. This position creates significant uncertainties over the status of unpatented mining claims and is not supported by statutory or common law.
A second question raised by the court involves the relationship between federal ownership and federal jurisdiction. Traditionally, the end
46
of federal ownership meant the end of federal jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction over federally owned lands stems from Article IV of the United
States48 Constitution. 47 This federal jurisdiction appears to be without
limit. Once property no longer belongs to the federal government and
42. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1368.
43. Id
44. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657,.658 n.1 (1980); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining
Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963); Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 350, 353 (1884).
45. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1920) (power of the federal
government does not cease until legal title has passed); Adams v. United States, 318 F.2d
861, 872 (9th Cir. 1963) (title does not pass with patent application but only with patent
approval).
46. See supra text accompanying note 41.
47. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976);
United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940). Certain limited types of property not at issue here are controlled pursuant to Article I. See Engdahl, State and Federal
Power Over Federal Property, 18 AMIz. L. REV. 283, 288-90 (1976).
48. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.
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is removed from article IV status, federal jurisdiction is removed with
the caveat that the federal government has authority to regulate all
categories of property in order to protect neighboring federal territory.4 9
Thus, once a claim is patented the federal government may regulate it
only to protect federal property. 0 Unpatented mining claims are subject
to federal regulation, whether or not they affect other federal property,
because they are federal property. The district court's blurring of the line
between patented and unpatented claims, which formerly reflected a difference between private fee and federal ownership, creates questions about
the extent of federal regulatory control over its own property.
A third question raised by the district court's decision involves the
role of local jurisdiction over federal territory. Traditionally, local governments have had the power to regulate activities on all federal lands when
not preempted by the federal government." Whether a parcel of land was
covered by an unpatented mining claim, a timber lease, or other private
right made no difference; the land was still subject to local regulatory control. If unpatented mining claims are not federal property, as suggested
by the district court, and not subject to federal article IV jurisdiction,
the preemptive limitations upon local police power may be diminished.
Although the court declined to reach the issue of local police power because
it found separate CZMA jurisdiction,5 2 its holding throws into flux the
traditional limitations over local control of privately held interests on
federal lands.
A fourth question is whether the court's holding is limited to unpatented mining claims. It based its holding not only on a finding that
unpatented claims may be patented, but also on the grounds that such
claims are valid property rights, and that the federal government cannot
prevent mining on mining claims.5 3 It is worth remembering that many

other private interests on federal lands such as timber, geothermal, and
fuel and fertilizer mineral leases are also property rights. The federal
government has the power to regulate these interests but not the power
to prevent the specified lease activity. While the validity and origin of
the court's "discretion to prevent" test are uncertain,5 4 the government
may condemn the property or cancel the lease and pay contract damages
if it truly wishes to prevent such activity. 55 By holding that the federal

49. Id at 546-47 (1976); United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979).
50. This is true unless other independent constitutional authority for regulation is
relevant.
51. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 530 (1976).
52. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1371.
53. Id. at 1370.
54. The district court also intimated that the federal government's sole discretion power
only extends to regulations which "impermissibly encroach" upon the right to exploit placer
claims for mining purposes. Id. at 1373. The federal government, however, can prevent certain mineral activities. United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979) cert.denied,
444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
55. North American Transp. & Trading Co. v. United States, 53 Cl. Ct. 424 (1918) affd,
253 U.S. 330 (1920). In addition, the appellate court in Granite Rock noted that the Forest
Service may condition mining on compliance with environmental regulations, although such
regulations must be reasonable. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1081.
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government lacks sole jurisdiction over unpatented mining claims because
they are protected property rights and because there are limitations on
federal control, the court raises the possibility that federal jurisdiction
over all types of private rights in federal lands may be limited and that
local control may be expanded. The implications of this are far-reaching
and it remains for another day to articulate more precisely the relationship between federal and local control over private property rights in
federal lands.
Finally, the court seems to ignore a host of other federal statutes and
regulations in arriving at its "no discretion" decision. Federal rules and
regulations that pervade all mining activity on federal lands point to the
existence of federal discretion over mining claims. The ability of the United6
States to regulate mineral development on federal lands is unquestioned.
The basis for this regulation is the property clause of the Constitution
57
and the commerce clause coupled with the necessary and proper clause.
An example of the immense degree of federal discretion over mining claims
is provided in United States v. Richardson.5 8 In that case, the ninth circuit considered whether the Forest Service, under the provisions of its
Organic Act59 and the Surface Resources Act,6 0 could force the owner of

a mineral claim to abandon the traditional but environmentally destructive exploration technique known as "trenching" in favor of a more expensive drilling program. The Ninth Circuit held, in what it considered
to be a decision of "poetic justice," that the claim owner could be forced
to change his excavation techniques in order to protect the surface
6
resources of the Gifford Pinchot National Forest. ' If this is not discre-

tion by the Forest Service, then it is hard to imagine what is.
FederalLands As Lands Held in Trust by the
Federal Government for the People of the United States
In addition to lands not under the sole discretion of the federal government, the CZMA also excludes lands "the use of which.., is held in trust
by the Federal Government.' '62 Both of these exclusions together encompass national parks, forests, wildlife refuges, and other such lands. 6 The
GraniteRock district court, after finding that mining claims are not within
the first exclusionary prong of sole discretion, also concluded that the trust
lands exclusion applies only to Indian reservations.6 4 The court pointed
56. See United States v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co. of Nevada, 644 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Richardson,
599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979).
57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (property clause); Id, art I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce clause);
Id, cl. 18 (necessary and proper).
58. 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979).
59. 16 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1985).
60. Surface Resources Act of July 23, 1955, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-614 (West. 1971).
61. United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290, 290-93 (9th Cir. 1979). See Marsh &
Sherwood, Metamorphosisin Mining Law: FederalRegulatory Amendment and Supplementation of the General Mining Law Since 1955, 26 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 209 (1980).
62. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(1) (West 1985).
63. See CONFERENcE REP. supra note 24, at 12.
64. Granite Rock, 590 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
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to a wealth of established precedent for the assertion that reservation65
lands belong to the United States and are held in trust for the Indians.
The court, however, ignored the traditional rule that all article IV lands
are held in trust for the people of the United States.6 6 The principle that
federal lands such as national forests are held in trust by the federal
government for the people of the United States set a standard by which
management of federal lands can be judged.67 Such management must
serve the broader public interest whether that be for mineral development
by private developers or conservation programs by federal wildlife experts.
If such lands are not held in trust, as the district court suggests, then
the parameters of management goals may be less certain. The court,
however, may not have intended to imply that lands such as national
forests are not held in trust by the federal government. It may simply
be the court's belief that Congress, in discussing trust lands, had narrowed
the traditional definition of such lands only with respect to this one
statute. There is no authority, however, for such a view.
There is no indication in the plain language of the CZMA or in the
legislative history of the Act that Congress intended to exempt one subcategory of trust land from its jurisdictional exclusion. The district court,
however, through grammatical sleight of hand declared that trust lands
cannot include other federal lands "the use of which is subject solely to
the discretion of... the Federal Government" because such an interpretation would result in redundant CZMA exclusions. 68 The finding of a redundancy to refute the plain language of an unambiguous statute is unwarranted. "Trust land" is a broad category which encompasses most of the
federal lands that are affected by the CZMA. Lands under the "sole discretion" of the federal government logically include lands under federal
jurisdiction and other lands for which Congress was reluctant to authorize
a substantial state regulatory role. These lands include lands under lease
to the federal government, such as Cape Kennedy or other federal projects.
Finally, if Congress intended to incorporate only Indian reservation
land in the CZMA jurisdictional exclusion, it is likely that they would have
expressly done so. Congress has ample ability and experience in drafting
statutes which expressly refer to "Indian lands. '69 Congress without doubt
would have referred to "Indian lands" or "Indian territory" if it had intended to restrict its exclusion to those lands only. The CZMA instead
65. Id at 1369. The court cited, among others, United States v. Bowling, 256 U.S. 484,
486-87 (1921).
66. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947); Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911) ("all public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of
the whole country"); United States v. Trinidad Coal and Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890);
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888).
67. See, e.g., GraniteRock, 590 F. Supp. at 1369-70; Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
524 (1911); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888).
68. There is no redundancy, of course, given the court's questionable conclusion that
mining claims are not within the sole discretion of the federal government. Granite Rock
590 F. Supp. at 1369; 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(1) (1985).
69. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162 (which deals with state jurisdiction over "Indian
country").
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refers to land "held in trust by the federal government," a term which
has heretofore referred to a number of categories of land including national forests.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF LOCAL CONTROL OVER MINING CLAIMS

A final and critical issue raised in the Granite Rock controversy is
the degree to which a local or state government can regulate activities
on a federal mining claim without being preempted by the federal government. Indeed, it is on the issue of federal preemption that the Ninth Circuit's decision in GraniteRock is most significant. State and local regulation of mining claims was contemplated by the Mining Law of 187270 and
is permissible unless a particular regulation adversely affects other federal
property or is preempted by other federal law or regulation. This preemption doctrine, as applicable to federal lands, was summarized by the
Supreme Court when it explained that "[t]he police power of the State
at least when there is no legislaextends over the federal public domain,
7
tion by Congress on the subject."

1

Federal preemption of local regulation occurs when Congress clearly
expresses an intent to usurp local power,7 when federal regulation is so

pervasive that there is no room left for local regulation73 or when the local
regulation produces a result inconsistent with the stated purpose of a
federal statute.7 4 There have been a number of cases in which the doctrine
of federal preemption has swept away local regulation of mining activities.7 5 Where local authorities have required a mineral operator to obtain
a local permit in order to proceed with development activities on unpatented mining claims, the permit requirements have often been found
preempted and unenforceable .76 This is precisely the issue upon which the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in GraniteRock, and found federal
preemption arising from the operation of the mining laws.7 7 These three
70. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 21-54 (West 1985).
71. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918). It is quite possible that the CZMA
has restricted the state police power over development activities in federal coastal areas to
the consistency review process only. See infra note 91.
72. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-50 (1963).
73. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956).
74. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918).
75. See, e.g., Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), affd,
445 U.S. 947 (1980).
76. Id; Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Colo. 1982); Elliott
v. Oregon Int'l Mining Co., 60 Or. App. 322, 654 P.2d 663 (1982). See also Skaw v. United
States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
77. An additional test for any finding of preemption has been suggested in Engdahl,
supranote 47 at 362-70. Engdahl argues that while Congress may utlihe any of its enumerated
powers for any prupose, including an "extraneous objective," Congress has preemptive powers
only when it exercises its enumerated powers for policies not extraneous to those powers.
Thus, for example, Congress may preempt state regulation of truck traffic, but not state
regulation of on-farm laborer living standards since the latter is not within the purpose of
Congress' commerce power. By this reasoning, Engdahl finds Congress to be totally incapable
of preempting state regulation of mining activities on federal lands because there is no
enumerated power to which federal mining policies relate. If there were any preemptive
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tests for preemption are useful in discerning the rationale for these preemption cases, in understanding their applicability to the GraniteRock facts,
and in developing a model for determining precisely when preemption will
be found to preclude local regulation of mining activities.
Express Preemption
Preemption of local permitting requirements over mining activities
on federal lands has never resulted from a finding of express congressional
intent to preempt. Clearly federal mining law contemplates that local
regulation shall play a major part in mining operations.18 While it is
arguable that the part played by local regulators has diminished in proportion to federal regulations over the years, local regulation is still permitted by federal law. Though preemption has not arisen from an expression of congressional intent to preempt state and local regulation, this
lack of express intent is not a bar to preemption on other grounds.
Pervasiveness of Regulation
Preemption has been found where federal mining regulations are so
pervasive that they occupy the field and leave no room for local regulation."9 The scope of power granted the federal government by the property clause is very broad and allows the federal government to legislate and
regulate all activity that affects federally owned land. In United States
v. Kleppe the Supreme Court considered the government's power to
manage wild burros on and off federal land and concluded that "Itihe power
over the public land... entrusted to Congress is without limitations."80
For this reason, "when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily
overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause.... A different rule would place the public domain
of the United States complete'8
ly at the mercy of state legislation." '

The effectiveness of the United States in regulating mineral development activities on federal lands is well documented.82 The federal governcapability, it would have to stem from an enumerated power, such as the promotion of national defense, rather than the property clause.
This rather novel theory was not at issue in GraniteRock because it was not addressed
by the parties or the court. In addition, it does not follow from any of the traditional tests
for preemption, and Engdahl does not cite any express authority for this proposition. It seems
obvious that federal regulation of mining on federal lands is the direct result of policies contemplated by Congress in exercising its enumerated powers over commerce or its own article IV property.
78. 30 U.S.C.A. § 22 (West 1971) (mining claims regulated "according to the local
customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable
and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States"). See also Butte City Water Co.
v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905) (Montana state regulation of mining claims upheld as not in
conflict with federal statute); 1 LINDLEY, LINDLEY ON MINES, §§ 61, 63, 76 (3d ed. 1914). But
see id. § 249 ("nor has the state the privilege of imposing conditions so onerous as to be
repugnant to the liberal spirit of the congressional laws").
79. See supra text accompanying note 76.
80. United States v. Kleppe, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
81. Id at 543 (quoting Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897)).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
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ment may even establish which types of exploration activities are appropriate on certain unpatented mining claims. 3 This regulation of decisions
previously left to the individual miner demonstrates the pervasive and
all-encompassing nature of federal regulation over mining claims. State
regulation cannot contradict this federal authority and control. The question thus becomes one of whether a particular state regulation does in
fact contradict federal law.
For example, in Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp.,8 4 the extensive

regulation of oil exploration and drilling under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 192085 was a contributing factor to the preemption of Ventura County's demand for a right of final project approval. When federal regulation
is not pervasive, however, local regulation may be permitted where it does
not frustrate federal statutory purposes, and does not make a mining
operation impossible. In GraniteRock, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected
Law of 1872 is
the argument that federal regulation under the Mining
86
so pervasive that all local law must be preempted.
In a recent Wyoming case, Gulf Oil Corporationv. Wyoming Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission,8 7 the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
a drilling permit requirement with an access condition was not preempted by federal law. In Gulf Oil, a state agency granted a permit to drill
for oil on a federal mineral lease. The permit contained the condition that
Gulf could not use its preferred access route through the town of Story,
but rather had to rely on an alternative access route. Gulf objected on
the ground that no other feasible access route existed. The court, however,
was unpersuaded and agreed with the state agency that Gulf had not carried its burden of proving that no other feasible access routes, including
helicopter transport, existed. The court rejected the argument that federal
mineral leasing and environmental statutes were so pervasive that they
preempted local law. Rather, the court found that "far from excluding
state participation, [Congress] has prescribed a significant role for local
governments in the regulation of the environmental impact of mineral
development on federal land." 8 8 Thus, no conflict existed with any pervasive scheme of federal law. 89

The vitality of Gulf Oil is in doubt, however, because of the Ninth Circuit's clear holding that a state is preempted from requiring permits for
federal mineral operations. It is arguable, however, that Wyoming may
still impose a condition that access not be made through the village of
Story. While a permit for drilling appears precluded by the logic of Granite
83. Id.
84. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
85. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-287 (West Supp. 1985).
86. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1083.
87. 693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985). For a further discussion of the facts and issues in Gulf
Oil see Note, The Broadened Jurisdictionof the Wyoming Oil and Gas ConservationCommission, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. (1986).
88. Gulf Oil 693 P.2d at 235.
89. See also State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 979 (1976) (no preemption of state pollution permitting requirements for dredge mining). But see GraniteRock,
768 F.2d at 1083 (rejecting Click's logic).
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Rock, a permit requirement for access through nonfederal lands may not
be preempted, so long as the permit requirement does not interfere with
federal management of federal land.90 To date, this issue has not been addressed by either the ninth or tenth circuits.
In GraniteRock it is also arguable that the consistency review provisions of the CZMA were intended to supplant other local regulation of
federally owned coastal areas2' Whether or not such local regulation is
precluded in any particular situation may best be determined on a caseby-case analysis.
In Granite Rock the California Coastal Commission asked Granite
Rock to obtain a permit. Although there is evidence that the commission
was opposed to the mining plans, 9 2 it is not clear that the commission
would have used the permitting process to require conditions or regulation inconsistent with federal mining and environmental laws and regulations. Yet, a mere ability to veto a project for want of a permit was found
to be inconsistent by the Ninth Circuit.93
Frustrationof Federal Statutory Purpose
The long history of federal mining statutes demonstrates that it is
the unambiguous intent of Congress to encourage and promote mining
activities on federal land. 4 As one court recognized, "[tjhe general purpose of the mineral laws is well understood; it was to encourage citizens
to assume the hazards of searching for and extracting valuable minerals
9 This statutory purpose preempts any
deposited in our public lands .... ,"
local attempts which would frustrate or prohibit mining.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
91. Although this issue was not reached by the Ninth Circuit in GraniteRock, it should
be noted that Title 16, United States Code, Section 1456(c) provides for a federal review of
activities on federal lands to ensure that such activities on federal lands are consistent with
local coastal protection plans. The California Coastal Commission failed to take advantage
of this provision. See supra text accompanying note 15. The conference report indicated that
Congress may have intended the consistency review provisions to be the exclusive means
by which a state coastal authority could regulate activities on federal land. According to
the report, "Iflederal lands are not included within a state's coastal zone. As to the use of
such lands which would affect a state's coastal zone, the provisions of Section 307(c) [16
U.S.C. § 1456(c)] would apply." H.R. REP. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 4822 (brakcets in original). See also 15 C.F.R. § 923.33(c)
(1984).
Note also that by this reasoning even the police power of the local government over
development activities may be restricted to participation in the consistency review process.
Finally, in Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 334 (1984) it was noted that the
consistency review process did not give the states an unfettered veto power over coastal
development.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 100-102.
93. GraniteRock, 768 F.2d at 1082.
94. See, e.g., GraniteRock, 768 F.2d at 1081; Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs,
•652 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Colo. 1982).
95. United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 F. 675, 682 (D. Idaho 1910). See also New Mercur
Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., 102 Utah 131, 142, 128 P.2d 269. 274 (1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 753 (1943); Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050, 1057
(Colo. 1982); Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 392, 401 (1885) (the Mining Act is "to promote
the development of the mining resources of the United States").
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Congressional statements of policy subsequent to 1872 confirm that
Congress continues to support and encourage the development of mineral
resources on federal lands. For example, in the Mining and Minerals Policy
Act of 197096 Congress declared that "it is the continuing policy fo the
Federal Government in the national interest to foster and encourage
private enterprise in (1) the development of economically sound and stable
domestic mining, minerals, metal and mineral reclamation industries.... "
This goal is repeated in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976 (FLPMA),9 7 and in the National Materials and Minerals Policy,
Research and Development Act of 1980.98
In contrast to this strong federal policy to promote and encourage
mining on federal lands, the goals and effects of the California Coastal
Commission serve to discourage mining. It is the uncontroverted policy
of the Coastal Commission to impose stringent conditions and exactions
on property owners who engage in any development on the coast.99 For
example, there is every likelihood that the Coastal Commission would require Granite Rock Company to dedicate substantial amounts of private
property to the commission or state in exchange for the right to continue
mining operations on federal lands.
Already the Coastal Commission is attempting to require the same
plaintiff to dedicate over one million dollars worth of private property to
the state in exchange for the right to repair and maintain an existing hiking trail across the Granite Rock property to be used by members of the
public. 100 If the Coastal Commission is found to have the ability to require
a permit, any permit conditions unrelated to the purpose of the mining
laws will raise unique preemption issues. Finally, the Coastal Commission has been instrumental in "encouraging" the County of Monterey to
adopt a Big Sur coast land use plan.'0 ' While the Coastal Commission
presently disapproves of the plan as a whole because it does not place
enough restrictions on development, it does approve the plan's mineral
resources section which states that, "large scale mineral development is
declared inappropriate.' '1
96. 30 U.S.C.A. § 21a (West 1971).
97. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(12) (West Supp. 1985).
98. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601, 1602, 1605 (West Supp. 1985).
99. See, e.g., Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Comm'n, 33 Cal. 3d 158,
163; 655 P.2d 306, 308, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1982).
100. Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, No. 79877 (Monterey, Cal. Super.
Ct.) (complaint filed Oct. 24, 1983). The specifics of this case are amazing and demonstrate
well the attitude of the Coastal Commission. Granite Rock owns private property adjacent

to its mining claims. A hiking trail runs through this property and is used by the public

with Granite Rock's permission. After Granite Rock cleared some undergrowth and repaired
some erosion damage on the trail, the Coastal Commission insisted that Granite Rock obtain a development permit for the trail repair and dedicate over one million dollars in private
property (corridors running along the trail and a nearby stream) to the state in exchange
for the permit.
101. California Coastal Commission, Big Sur Coast Land Use Plan (Memorandum Aug.
21, 1984).

102. Id. at 5.
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When a local agency attempts to regulate mining on federal lands to
the point that mining becomes virtually impossible, or attempts to prohibit or impose a highly discretionary or confiscatory permitting process
upon mineral activity on federal lands, courts have repeatedly held that
such requirements are preempted by federal laws. A clear expression of
this doctrine is found in the Ninth Circuit's GraniteRock decision. There,
the court unequivocally held that a state has no permitting authority over
mining on federal lands. The court followed the reasoning used in a line
of cases which holds that the state regulation cannot deliberately interfere
with the congressional purpose to promote mining. 03 The court also relied
on a series of nonmining cases such as First Iowa Hydro-Electric
Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n,'0 4 where the mere presence of
federal authority to either allow or disallow a development such as a power
project is often enough to preclude a state's ability to hold a similar power
to approve or deny the same project. These two bases for the court's ruling are discussed below.
Preemption Based on the Purpose of the Mining Laws
A series of state cases and one Ninth Circuit case examined the purpose and effect of federal mining laws. The conclusion reached in these
cases was that while state environmental regulation is not precluded, it
is certainly limited by federal mining law. For example, in Brubaker v.
Board of County Commissioners,'05 the Colorado Supreme Court held that
the El Paso County Board of Commissioners was preempted from refusing to grant a special use permit for drilling operations on federal land
because the operations had already been approved by the federal government. Despite assertions by the county that it was merely conditioning
development upon compliance with reasonable legislative standards, the
court found that there was preemption because the board applied its zon10 6
ing ordinances to prohibit a federally authorized use of federal property.
In Brubaker and Granite Rock, the courts found unpersuasive the
argument that federally approved operating plans provide an express basis
for local jurisdiction. The operating plan in Brubaker, required that "the
operator... shall comply with the regulations of... State, County, and
Municipal laws.... ,,"07 In GraniteRock, the plan stipulated that "Granite
Rock is responsible for obtaining any necessary [coastal commission]
permits.' 0 In Brubaker,the court determined that the local regulations
were not "applicable," and further that the Forest Service is without power
to issue a permit which makes the ultimate decision of whether or not
there can be mineral development on federal property subject to the discretion of local authorities.'0 9 Finally, the court held that "Forest Service
103. See GraniteRock, 768 F.2d at 1081-83 (citing Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1080).
104. 328 U.S. 152 (1940).
105. 652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982).
106. Id at 1054.
107. Id
108. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1083.
109. Brubaker, 652 P.2d at 1057.
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regulations governing such operating plans recognize that those plans may
not be used to prohibit legislatively authorized mining activities."," In
Granite Rock, the Ninth Circuit put it more succinctly holding that
because federal regulations preempted state permitting authority, "[a)
routine staff statement cannot change the effect of the formally adopted
regulations.""'
In Elliott v. Oregon InternationalMining Company,"2 the Oregon
Court of Appeals held that state regulation which prohibited a mineral
claimant from conducting surface mining on land where the surface estate
is owned by a private owner but the mineral estate was reserved to the
federal government was preempted by federal law because the state regulation clearly interfered with purposes of the federal mining laws." 3
This case served to clarify the Oregon Supreme Court's earlier position in State ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard"4 that state environmental regulation of mining activities was not preempted by federal law. Elliott made
it clear that while such reasonable regulation was permissible, it could
not prohibit the federally sanctioned mining activities.
In Ventura County the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ventura County's alleged licensing authority over drilling operations pursuant
to leases on federal lands was preempted because it was contrary to federal
law." 5 The GraniteRock appellate court quoted with approval the holding
in Ventura County that "Ventura cannot prohibit that use, either temporarily or permanently, in an attempt to substitute its judgment for that
of Congress.""11 6 The very existence of the licensing condition was held
to be preempted, and the fact that Gulf had not applied for a license was
found to be irrelevant."' This same rationale was applied in Skaw v. United
States, in which the absence of local permits for a mining claim was held
to be irrelevant to the requirement that the federal government compensate the taking of a claim." 8
In State ex rel Andrus v. Click," 9 the Idaho Supreme Court upheld
a local regulation which required a dredging permit as long as the requirement did not render it impossible to mine or conflict with federal law. The
vitality of the Click decision, however, has been severely undermined by
the GraniteRock decision in which the Ninth Circuit referred to Click and
110. Id111. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1083.
112. 60 Or. App 474, 654 P.2d 663 (1982).
113. Id. at 482-83, 654 P.2d at 668.
114. 31 Or. App. 269; 570 P.2d 1190 (1977).
115. Ventura County, 601 F.2d 1080. The local regulations frustrated the purpose of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which leaves room for nonconflicting state regulation. The Ventura court also found the pervasive nature of federal energy regulation relevant.
116. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1082 (quoting Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1084).
117. Ventura County, 601 F.2d 1084-85. The Ventura court relied upon Federal Power
Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), and First Iowa Hyrdo-Electric v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 177-79 (1940), in which local licensing requirements were held preempted by federal law.
118. Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 940-41 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
119. 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol21/iss1/4

18

Burling: Local Control of Mining Activities on Federal Lands

1986

CONTROL OF MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS

stated "[w]e find unpersuasive the argument that the Mining Act and
these regulations do no more than encourage mining subject to minimum
federal environmental regulation, leaving the states free to condition the
' °
ability to mine on adhering to more stringent requirements."'
Finally, in Gulf Oil,1 2' the evidence of congressional intent to include

state participation in mineral leasing and environmental laws was seen
by the Wyoming Supreme Court as a sanction for such local regulation.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the Wyoming regulations "constitute legitimate means of guiding mineral development without prohibiting it."'21 2 The fact that the condition imposed by the state permit,

namely helicopter access, was considered by Gulf to effectively preclude
an economical exploration program did not enter the court's equation
because Gulf had not proved such access was prohibitory. Only if Gulf
had been able to prove that the permit's access condition in fact made
mineral exploration impossible could it have been assumed that a conflict with a statutory congressional purpose might exist.
Interestingly enough, the court in Gulf Oil, relied favorably on the
district court decision in GraniteRock for the proposition that state permitting authority was permissible.2 3 With the reversal of the lower court's
GraniteRock decision, the rationale for the Gulf Oil decision is somewhat
less persuasive. The Tenth Circuit has not yet had an opportunity to address these issues.
The court in Gulf Oil also distinguished Ventura and Brubaker on the
grounds that the regulations in those cases were clearly intended to prohibit mineral exploration, whereas the Wyoming state agency attempted
4
only to protect the environment rather than prohibit exploration.' In
GraniteRock, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected the distinction between
regulation and prohibition and followed the Supreme Court's decision in
FirstIowa. 5
Preemption Based on the First Iowa Doctrine
The Ninth Circuit in Granite Rock was careful to note that though
federal law encourages an activity, it does not follow that a state environmental regulation which incidentally discourages the activity is
automatically preempted.' 6 Some local regulation is, therefore, acceptable.'2 This approval of local regulation, even if it incidentally interferes
120. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1083.
121. 693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985).
122. Id at 237.
123. Id at 238.
124. Id. at 237.
125. See Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1082.
126. Id. at 1081.
127. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Silkwood
v. Kerr McGee Corporation, 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984). In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), local regulations were upheld despite incidental interference with
a federal purpose to promote coal use. The Coastal Commission argued that this case effec-
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with the federal purpose of encouraging mining raises the question of
whether the Brubaker line of cases provides sufficient justification for the
preemption of local regulation if it interferes with the purposes of federal
mining law. In the Brubaker cases, however, the interference was more
than "incidental." Furthermore, these cases are supported by Granite
Rock in which the appellate court looked beyond the issue of incidental
interference and found that state permitting requirements do not necessarily escape preemption, even if issuance of the permit is conditioned only
upon reasonable requirements.' The court was unpersuaded that a distinction could be made between permit requirements designed to prohibit
mining and those designed only to regulate it because there are instances
in which a state permitting requirement is absolutely preempted,
regardless of whether or not that requirement is based upon only
reasonable conditions. 2 9
The holding in the Granite Rock appellate decision that state permit
requirements may be preempted is based upon the First Iowa doctrine
that state regulations which interfere with federal purposes are preempted, and upon the second prong of the preemption test that state laws may
not interfere with the operation of federal law. There, the Supreme Court
held that because the Federal Power Act requires that a federal permit
be obtained prior to the construction of a hydroelectric dam, the state
could not also condition the construction of the dam upon the attainment
of a state permit. 3 0 Following this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit in Ventura concluded that because federal authorities had already issued drilling permits, the local authorities could not require separate drilling
permits."'
It is crucial to an understanding of FirstIowa, however, to recognize
that a local permit requirement is not per se preempted by a federal permit requirement for the same project. Thus, in Pacific Gas & Electric v.
State Energy Resources Conservation& Development Commission,' the
Supreme Court held that a utility could be prevented from building a
federally approved nuclear power plant by a state requirement that a state
nuclear waste disposal certificate first be obtained.
In order to reconcile Pacific Gas with First Iowa, it is necessary to
look beyond the mere existence of a federal permit requirement and consider exactly what activity is being permitted by the federal regulatory
scheme. In cases like FirstIowa, for example, it was found that the federal
permit requirement was part of a comprehensive federal planning process
tively overruled Ventura, but is is clear that it did not because the congressional coal policy

was very broad and general and did not expressly nor intentionally preempt all local regulations. Id at 633-36. In Ventura, on the other hand, local regulations were interfering with
specific federal permitting regulations and policies.

128. 768 F.2d at 1081-82.
129. Id at 1082.
130. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152,
164 (1946).
131. Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1084.
132. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
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intended to cover virtually all aspects of the construction of a hydropower
dam."3 For that reason, the state could not dictate design parameters for
the project if such state parameters conflicted with decisions made
through the federal planning process. Likewise, in Ventura County, the
federal drilling permit encompassed a federal decision to allow drilling on
preempta particular parcel of federal property and the county was thus
3 4 In Pacific
issue.'
identical
an
ed from making an independent decision on
Gas, the federal permit requirement was designed to ensure the safety
of nuclear power plant construction and therefore the state was not allowed
to impose its own independent safety permitting system. Because the
federal permitting regulation did not cover or even attempt to address
such nonsafety issues as the economic aspects of waste disposal, the state
was free to regulate in this area.'35
Applying this reasoning to mining law, the Granite Rock appellate
court considered the realm of considerations addressed by the Forest Service's regulatory approval process of mining plans of operations. The court
found that the purpose for requiring a plan of operations is to protect the
surface resources and environment.'3 6 Although Forest Service regulations
do not establish environmental standards, and the regulations recognize
that states may enact stricter environmental standards, the final decision to allow or not to allow mining on federal lands rests with the Forest
Service. Thus, the court reasoned that although a state may urge the
Forest Service to reject or revoke a mining permit on state environmental grounds, the federal government alone has ultimate authority over enonly the Forest Servironmental protection of the national forests and
37
vice may interfere with a federal mining permit.'
SUMMARY: WHEN LOCAL REGULATIONS ARE PREEMPTED
BY FEDERAL MINING LAW

This reasoning leads to the crux of the issue: When does a state permitting requirement impermissibly interfere with a federal permitting
scheme? Apparently a state permit requirement does not interfere simply because it incidentally discourages a federally approved activity.
Where Congress intended certain regulatory decisions to rest with the
federal government, however, state regulations which interfere with those
decisions violate the supremacy clause.
require
Thus, the court in Brubakerheld that El Paso County cannot
3
a drilling permit which duplicates a federal drilling permit. ' Similarly,
the court in Elliot held that Grant County may not completely prohibit
133. FirstIowa, 328 U.S. at 164. See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S.
435 (1955).
134. Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1084. See also, Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963)
(federal patent attorneys not required to obtain state permit to practice law).
135. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 198, 204 (1983).
136. Granite Rock, 768 F.2d at 1081.
137. Id. at 1083.
138. Brubaker, 652 P.2d at 1050.
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an activity expressly considered and permitted by federal law. 13 9 Finally,
in Gulf Oil it must be questioned whether the Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission has the power to grant Gulf Oil a permit to drill a well, subject to the condition that Gulf find an alternative route. The propriety
of this decision must turn on whether the commission's denial of Gulf's
preferred access contradicts a federal determination of the same issue.
The federal government initially conditioned its permit on the use of a
northern access route and then temporarily suspended operating and producing requirements pending a review of the access route. 140 Thus, the
federal government's permitting process clearly encompasses environmental considerations and an express decision on the proper access route.
Therefore, if the Granite Rock analysis were to apply in Gulf Oil it is
arguable that Gulf Oil should be free to utilize whatever access route is
mandated by the federal government and that the State of Wyoming has
no power to require a permit dictating the use of a different access route,
at least for access across federal property. Gulf Oil can probably be harmonized with GraniteRock, however, with respect to access permits across
state land. Even if the federal government expressly approved access
across state lands, it is difficult to imagine that a state could not
reasonably regulate that access, unless a later court dramatically expands
the Kleppe doctrine.'14 In the meantime, Gulf Oil allows, and GraniteRock
does not appear to forbid, permitting of activities off federal land even
if incidentally addressed by federal regulation.
It should be noted that Granite Rock does not spell the end for all
local permitting of mining operations on federal lands. Local permitting
is probably still acceptable for those activities or considerations which
are not covered by the federal permitting process. Thus, permits for state
water rights or access over state lands may still be acceptable even if they
incidentally interfere with the purposes of the mining laws. State permits
pursuant to federally mandated state air quality, water quality, or reclamation programs would also survive preemption," as should state attempts
to control nuisances not otherwise specifically allowed by federal
authorities.14 Entities such as the Coastal Commission, however, which
are bent on prohibiting local mining, must beware. There is still no room
for state law which purposely stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.1"
139. Elliot v. Oregon Int'l. Mining Co. 60 Or. App. 474, 654 P.2d 633 (1982).
140. Gulf Oil, 693 P.2d at 233.
141. See supra text accompanying note 47-49.
142. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 228.8 (1985). The Coastal Commission argued that because
these permits were allowed or even required by federal law, then all state permitting requirements must be allowed.
143. Certain examples of state shutdowns of mining operations to abate notorious
nuisances are well established. For example, California was able to stop large scale hydraulic
mining that was choking the rivers with silt and causing extensive flooding and crop damage
in the Sacramento Valley. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753
(9th Cir. 1884). In Woodruff, it is unclear whether the subject mining claims were patented
or unpatented. Regulation, however, is a concept quite distinct from nuisance abatement.
144. See supra note 127.
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State Regulatory Power by DefaultFederal Involvement in the Granite Rock Litigation
The failure of the district court to recognize the role of the federal
government in the regulation and management of mining claims on federal
property may stem in part from the lack of involvement in the litigation.
Although the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and
Justice were apprised of the significance of the controversy, there was
no federal involvement until after the district court decision was made
and the Granite Rock Company had filed a notice of appeal. Thus, it was
left to Granite Rock to assert the existence of crucial federal interests
in this case. This lack of leadership by the federal government in the protection of vital federal interests is indicative of the climate that leads to
the usurpation of federal power by state and local governments.
CONCLUSION

In the field of mineral development, GraniteRock v. CaliforniaCoastal
Commission is particularly instructive. A deposit of high-grade chemically
pure limestone has been discovered in an area of outstanding natural beauty. While the planned mining operations are designed not to interfere with
area's beauty, the project is being fiercely opposed by environmental
groups. The private right to proceed with reasonable development of mining claims is in conflict with the local interest of preservation which, in
turn, is in conflict with the federal interest in promoting a strong,
regulated, minerals industry. The conflict has crystallized in a dispute over
whether or not the mining company must go through a local permitting
process in addition to the established federal permitting process.
The law is well established that while a local agency may regulate
private activities such as mining on federal lands, that agency may neither
prohibit such mining nor deliberately frustrate the purpose of the federal
laws to promote a regulated mining industry.
In reaching the decision that Granite Rock Company was subject to
the permitting jurisdiction of the California Coastal Commission, the
district court reached some novel conclusions concerning the nature of
federal mining claims. The district court's decision creates uncertainty
concerning the status of property rights in mining claims and generates
confusion regarding state and federal regulatory jurisdiction over those
claims. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of mining claim status
because it found that the disputed state regulation was preempted on independent grounds. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that, because the
federal government permitting process encompasses the field of environmental protection, the state cannot condition mining upon its own
environmental protection permitting process. The status of other local
regulation of private development activities on federal lands has yet to
be settled.
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